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The application of operational art in the regressive planning process is a vital aspect of any successful operation. Three crucial steps of its methodology should provide the foundation for a plan to achieve the desired end state through economy of effort and minimal loss of life.
The first step is to clearly define the objective. Since the objective is the starting point for regressive planning, it will be the cornerstone of this foundation and must be unambiguous.
No amount of planning will produce a survivable course of action if it is built on vagaries from the onset. The second step is to identify and appoint an operational commander and establish a command and control structure. It must be appropriate in depth and scope for the given size of the operation and account for transition to post-conflict operations. It should ensure unity of effort, provide for centralized direction and decentralized execution, provide an environment for applying common doctrine, and ensure interoperability.
1 If this is not solved early and accurately the consequences could undermine advantages in technology, initiative, industrial capacity, and even the most superhuman efforts on the battlefield.
Deficient command and control relationships will also have devastating effects on the remaining operational functions of intelligence, command and control warfare, fires, logistics, and protections. Once these relationships are established, if they are established correctly, they should not require significant changes. The third step is to analyze and understand the operational factors of force, space, and time, for these will determine whether or not the objective is attainable within the limits of the available support and force structure.
Only after these areas are addressed should the planning staff be allowed to continue with analysis of the enemy's center of gravity, one's own center of gravity, and course of action development. Agreeable ignorance is not a quality a commander should tolerate from his staff. If an aspect of the plan is identified as not feasible, it needs to be verified through analysis and communicated up the chain of command as soon as possible.
The German invasion of southern Russia in 1942 is an example of an operation that failed to follow the guidelines set forth in the preceding paragraph. For today's operational commander, the abject failure of the invasion provides relevant lessons on the consequences of a breakdown in these critical areas. Problems for the Germans started with objectives that
were not clear and continued with a command and control structure that was highly centralized, disproportionate in span and depth of control, and not unified in command or effort. This adversely impacted the cognizance of Adolph Hitler's staff planners, and caused them to overlook or ignore many of the pertinent operational factors. The combination of these mistakes directly contributed to the complete annihilation of the German Sixth Army, the Italian Eighth Army, and four Romanian divisions at Stalingrad. Of the quarter of a million men in these forces, approximately fifty thousand wounded soldiers and several thousand healthy specialists were evacuated by air, one hundred twenty-three thousand were captured and sent to prison camps and the rest were killed by disease, the elements, starvation, and enemy fire. Only five thousand of the prisoners survived captivity to return home after the war. This paper will analyze the objectives and guidance Hitler gave his staffs, the command and control structure he ultimately forced upon his military professionals, and the key operational factors that impacted the operation. Additionally, the execution of the plan will be discussed to provide the reader with the results of the planning failures.
In Further complicating the planning process for BLUE was the fact that Hitler's planning guidance was contradictory. He wanted a blitzkrieg assault but forbade the tanks from outrunning the infantry. He wanted encirclement and destruction of the Russian army but encirclement required speed and maneuver; destruction required mass and concentration. He wanted complete control, yet in order to be successful, maneuver forces required freedom of action on the part of the field commanders. Additionally, a limited amount of manpower and materiel was available for the operation, but Hitler was convinced that the German edge in technology, training, and tactics would combine with the "inferiority of the Slavs" to guarantee a victory.
If planning is allowed to continue based on objectives that are open to interpretation, the final plan will be extremely difficult to support with the operational functions of logistics, intelligence, fires, and above all else command and control. It is therefore absolutely critical to identify and correct this problem early in the planning cycle. This responsibility rests with the operational commander and his staff. If the command and control relationships are properly constructed to ensure unity of command and unity of effort, the right people will ask the right questions early and be able to define what is possible based on rational calculus and acceptable risk.
The Germans never identified an operational commander for BLUE. Unity of effort in the planning process instantly became a problem, and this had cascading effects on the battlefield. "Hitler wanted to smash the Russians by breaking the power of their army in the south, capturing the seat of the Russian economy, and then taking the option of wheeling up behind Moscow or down to the Baku oil fields. But his Generals had far less ambitious hopes and they disregarded the last part of the plan. The result was that OKW, the supreme command of the armed forces, had one plan, and OKH, the command of the army, had another". He alone maintained the big picture and as a result, his orders were often confusing and without foundation to his commanders in the field who were forced to be reactive instead of proactive.
To this point it is clear that Hitler failed to provide clear objectives and the military was
shackled to a chain of command that had serious weaknesses. rest were packed dirt and were nearly unusable for heavy wheeled vehicles in the spring and early summer. The great distances that trucks and tanks had to travel on these roads meant that numerous repair depots needed to be established and kept supplied with spare parts and POL products. This had the further implication that the rear area needed to be secured and the flank well protected to account for these depots isolated on the vast steppe. Railroads
were not the same gauge as the German ones and most lines were only single track. Coal and special water filtration devices needed to be brought in from Germany to run the German locomotives and the great distances the trains ran made them susceptible to attack. 15 Since rail was the primary means of re-supplying the army, tracks and bridges needed to be protected with considerable forces, further depleting the number of frontline troops available for combat operations. As the attack advanced, the corresponding lines of communication were stretched further and further. The weather was a constant concern and, when balanced against factor time, was an advantage for the enemy, who was not only acclimated but had considerably shorter supply lines. The most challenging aspect of the space was the huge space to force ratio confronting the German planners and the long lines of communication.
To attack the vast expanse of the Ukraine and Crimea all the way to Stalingrad and Groznyy,
Hitler and the General Staff committed just over 1,000,000 men and 1,500 tanks along a front that was 500 miles long.
Time was another factor that presented considerable difficulties. Following the start of the operation in late June, the advancing forces could only expect four months of favorable weather before the Russian winter set in. This meant the conquest of nearly 200,000 square miles of territory plus the establishment of an infrastructure to support the extended forces.
The enemy could very easily trade space for time, and unfortunately for the invaders, the defenders knew all too well exactly how much time that was. For the Germans, the speed required to not only advance but also maneuver meant that operational pauses needed to be accounted for in their planning in order to regroup and most importantly, refuel their mechanized forces. Taken Groznyy. A thrust towards the Caucasus was anticipated but plans for it were not worked out in detail in the spring of 1942 due to the complexity of the operation to first secure the Donets Basin and the Don-Volga land bridge. 16 This was the best the staff could produce given the nebulous objectives. All they could expect was that careful phasing and economy 16 Schroter, Stalingrad, 22. of effort would increase the chances of success and hopefully impart devastating effects on the overall ability for Russia to sustain its forces and economy.
Despite what has been identified as failures in the foundation of the planning process, it is impossible to determine if BLUE had any chance for success. The Russians were caught largely unprepared for the initial onslaught, but Hitler undermined his own forces by changing his objective and introducing more error into an already flawed solution. On July 
